Averted Piping Failure—Earth Dam on Permeable Foundation by Newhouse, Scott
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
International Conference on Case Histories in 
Geotechnical Engineering 
(2008) - Sixth International Conference on Case 
Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
14 Aug 2008, 4:30pm - 6:00pm 
Averted Piping Failure—Earth Dam on Permeable Foundation 
Scott Newhouse 
Bechtel Power Corporation, Frederick, MD 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge 
 Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Newhouse, Scott, "Averted Piping Failure—Earth Dam on Permeable Foundation" (2008). International 
Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 10. 
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/6icchge/session02/10 
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering by an authorized 
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including 
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please 
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
 Paper No. 2.28 1 
AVERTED PIPING FAILURE—EARTH DAM ON PERMEABLE FOUNDATION 
Scott Newhouse 
Bechtel Power Corporation 
5275 Westview Drive 
Frederick, MD 21703 
ABSTRACT 
“The dam builder has substantial control over the properties of the structure he builds, but he must take the foundation as it is 
furnished by nature.” (Cedergren, 1989) 
This paper presents the case of an earth dam built on a permeable foundation where seepage problems nearly caused failure of the 
dam. Early during first filling, before the lake was even half full, the dam showed significant seepage. Seepage boils appeared at the 
dam’s toe, indicating the onset of piping failure through the foundation. Although seepage boils indicating a failure mechanism 
appeared, dam failure was averted. The paper describes the events leading to the dam’s first filling incident, the averting of failure, 
and engineering for renovation. 
Construction of dams on permeable soils is relatively common (often unavoidable). The typical dam site has some alluvial soil in 
vicinity of the water course, soils that are usually permeable. Potential for seepage-related problems generally depends on the engineer 
recognizing a permeable foundation and designing the dam accordingly. The dam’s behavior—good or bad—depends on the measures 
taken to accommodate seepage, such as a foundation seepage cutoff and filter-drain protection. Higher permeability generally means 
higher potential for problems at the downstream toe. This paper presents several interesting aspects of a case history 
supporting/illustrating this contention: 
● Original design and construction 
● Problems and near-failure conditions encountered at first filling 
● Comparison of the dam to others with permeable foundations and evaluation of other dams where design did and did not 
accommodate permeable foundation conditions 
● Engineering approach to renovation 




Lake Mailande Dam was originally built in 1994 as a 
homogeneous embankment (without filter/drain protection). 
Figure 1 depicts the typical cross section, taken from the 
construction plans, and depicts the soil profile beneath the 
dam. As shown in Fig. 1, design did not include seepage 
control—neither a cutoff in the foundation nor an internal 
filter/drain. The construction plans did not address foundation 
treatment at all, leading to extensive questions during 
construction regarding soft soils, high groundwater, and 
seepage control. The dam is about 55 ft high and 1,800 ft crest 
length, with 337,000 cu yd of embankment fill. The dam has 
sparse rural development downstream that includes houses in 
its flood path and a county road at the toe. Accordingly, it is 
classified high hazard. Lake Mailande is privately owned, 
used solely for recreation. 
Fig. 1.  Lake Mailande Dam—Typical Section and Soil Profile 
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Initial Exploration 
Exploration included only three widely spaced borings, only 
one of which was close to the dam’s footprint. The other two 
soil borings were in borrow areas. Initial exploration did not 
include any laboratory testing, neither index nor engineering 
tests. It appeared that the dam’s designer ignored the soil 
conditions and designed the dam as if the foundation had 
nothing to do with a successful structure. The homogeneous 
design was not based on any seepage analysis or prediction of 
water pressures/hydraulic gradient at the toe. Construction 
commenced based on essentially no exploration or 
geotechnical analysis. 
Supplemental Exploration 
After construction commenced, further exploration was 
performed to establish the soil conditions depicted in Fig. 1. 
Exploration shows: 
● Significant layers of sand in the foundation 
● Significant coefficient of hydraulic conductivity (k), 
of maximum 10-3 cm/s 
● Artesian water pressure rising to near 2 ft above 
ground surface 
Impact of Permeable Foundation Soils on Dam 
Figure 2 illustrates how a permeable foundation results in 
under-seepage if the dam lacks adequate seepage control 
measures. As far as the impact on dam safety of seepage into 
and through the foundation, permeable soil conditions can be 
interpreted to either enhance dam safety or act against it. 
Permeable foundation conditions are frequently interpreted as 
providing drainage, thus lowering water pressure and related 
hydraulic gradient at the toe. Alternatively, permeable 
foundation soil can be interpreted to effect the opposite, 
making water pressure and hydraulic gradient higher at the 
toe. Stability of the downstream slope is directly dependent on 
these two parameters—water pressure and hydraulic gradient. 
Figure 3 shows how permeable soil in the foundation can be 
interpreted to act as a blanket drain, lowering hydraulic 
gradient, effecting a stable slope. Figure 4 illustrates a 
condition where permeable soil creates the opposite effect, 
where under-seepage drives hydraulic gradient higher than the 
critical value where soil erosion results, effecting a dangerous 
condition at the toe. 
Potential Piping Through Foundation 
Figure 4 is taken from Danny McCook’s A Comprehensive 
Discussion of Piping and Internal Erosion Failure 
Mechanisms (McCook, 2004). This figure illustrates a 
potential piping failure mechanism for conditions similar to 
those at the Lake Mailande Dam (Fig. 1). Figure 4 depicts a 
homogeneous embankment built on a thin surficial clay layer 
overlying a sand aquifer. McCook notes that such a 
mechanism is a well established one related to failure of flood 
protection levees, and is more common in levees than in dams. 
He points out that the mechanism is actually rare in failures of 
earth dams. 
Fig. 2.  Under-seepage Through Permeable Foundation 
(From USACE, 1986) 
Fig. 3.  Effect of Permeable Blanket Drain  
(From BuRec, 1987) 
Fig. 4.  Potential Foundation Piping Mechanism: Heave 
caused by excessive seepage pressures under surface clay 
blanket. Piping of sand aquifer occurs from flow of water 
through defect in clay blanket, creating sand boil at ground 
surface. (From McCook, 2004) 
Could the mechanism illustrated in Fig. 4 form in the Lake 
Mailande Dam when the lake is filled? 
Effect of Horizontal Permeability 
Horizontal k will almost always exceed vertical k in any soil, 
whether native in situ soil or fill soil in an embankment. 
References indicate the ratio of kh:kv is a minimum of 9 or 10 
(Dennis et al., 1971). Seepage analysis must account for this 
ratio, as illustrated in Fig. 5. Seepage analyses and flow nets 
based on kh:kv ratio of 1 only represent theoretical conditions. 
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Fig. 5. Effect of kh:kv Ratio on Seepage Line  
(From US Army Corps of Engineers, 1986) 
CONVENTIONAL DESIGN FOR PERMEABLE 
FOUNDATIONS 
In predicting the dam’s behavior, one must account for the 
effect of seepage through the permeable foundation. Under-
seepage will affect the position of the seepage line, and thus 
stability, water pressure, and hydraulic gradient at the toe. The 
US Bureau of Reclamation design manual states that 
"Whenever economically possible, seepage through a pervious 
foundation should be cut off by a trench extending to bedrock 
or other impervious stratum. This is the most positive means 
of controlling the amount of seepage and ensuring that no 
difficulty will be encountered by piping through the 
foundation or by uplift pressures at the downstream toe." 
(BuRec, 1987) As this excerpt suggests, a dam on a permeable 
foundation is subject to uplift and potential piping at the toe 
from under-seepage. Figure 6 (on page 4) illustrates BuRec 
guidelines for construction on permeable foundations, 
illustrating the use of a foundation cutoff coincident with an 
internal drain. 
Many dams with seepage-related problems would not have 
those problems had construction included an adequate cutoff. 
Cedergren (1989) cites an example of a dam with a foundation 
so permeable that the reservoir could not fill. On occasions of 
heavy rain when the reservoir did partially fill, the 
downstream slope was subjected to such seepage pressure that 
boils appeared, and it was unstable. Cedergren concluded that 
the dam's problems were due to a foundation gravel layer that 
could and should have been cut off in construction, directly 
aligning with BuRec guidelines presented in Fig. 6. 
According to the BuRec design guide, the Lake Mailande 
Dam should have one of the cross sections shown in Fig. 6. If 
the dam is to be built without a cutoff, as planned, the design 
guide indicates its cross section should look like Section (C), 
in the BuRec figure (Fig. 6). How will the dam perform if it is 
instead constructed as shown in Fig. 1? 
Prediction of Seepage Line within Dam 
Figure 7 illustrates a predicted line of seepage within the dam 
for a full reservoir condition. The predicted line of seepage is 
based on the piezometer measurements shown taken during 
initial filling, at the low lake elevation shown. This predicted 
seepage line was sketched using methods from Cedergren 
(1989), based on the seepage line exhibited by piezometer 
measurements and flow net analysis based on an assumed kh:kv 
ratio of 10. The piezometer data show that head and hydraulic 
gradient were increasing at the toe with increasing lake 
elevation. This figure illustrates that the dam as designed, with 
no foundation seepage cutoff and no internal drain to control 
seepage pressure, would develop intolerable water pressure 
and hydraulic gradient at the toe long before the lake reached 
its design elevation. Should this predicted condition be 
considered accurate? How will the seepage line develop in the 
dam at higher lake elevation? 
Fig. 7.  Predicted Line of Seepage at Full Reservoir 
FIRST FILLING—AVERTED PIPING FAILURE 
“Lack of viable alternatives always encourages wishful 
thinking.”—J.M. Duncan 
At the time conditions in the dam were as illustrated on Fig. 7 
seepage problems developed. At this time, reservoir filling had 
begun, and the lake was less than 50% filled. The toe near 
maximum section became saturated, a shallow slide developed 
near the toe, and a seepage boil appeared, as illustrated in 
Fig. 8 (on page 5). Figure 8 shows the dam at its maximum 
section. At the time the boil and slide developed, a piezometer 
at this location indicated head at the toe nearly 12 ft above the 
ground surface. 
The development of the boil indicates that excessive hydraulic 
gradient developed even with the lake less than 50% full, with 
a water head near 20 ft of the design 45 ft head. Conditions at 
this stage clearly showed that continued filling would result in 
internal erosion of soil from the foundation, and likely a soil 
pipe, resulting in a breech—the condition illustrated in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 6.  Seepage Control for Permeable Foundations (From Bureau of Reclamation, 1987) 
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The seepage boil was covered with a fabric filter and stone 
ballast to control erosion. State officials directed that the lake 
be lowered to a safe level until the dam was renovated. 
Lowering the lake level and covering the boils averted dam 
failure by erosion/piping through the foundation. The initial 
prediction that a homogeneous dam could be built on the 
permeable foundation at this site was obviously wrong. 
At the time the conditions depicted in Fig. 8 formed, the 
design engineer interpreted the boil as a harmless spring, and 
interpreted the piezometer level as an effect of consolidation 
due to pressure on the ground from the embankment. 
However, facts did not support these interpretations: 
● The seepage boil clearly had a cone of deposition 
showing fine soil being eroded. 
● The piezometer level showed steady increase with 
increasing lake elevation, not with increasing 
embankment height. Excess pore pressure from 
consolidation would correlate with the pressure 
applied by increasing height of embankment fill and 
would show dissipation over time instead of a steady 
increase. 
REDESIGN AND RENOVATION OF A  
BRAND NEW DAM 
“The ground is not vindictive.…just as it is unsympathetic 
when winning, it doesn’t care at all when it loses.”— 
G.S. Brierly 
Figure 9 shows the typical cross section engineers developed 
to renovate the dam and ensure downstream slope stability and 
safety against piping. Engineers had difficulty in evaluating 
the need for a foundation seepage cutoff. As shown in Fig. 9, 
engineers decided that water pressure and hydraulic gradient 
could be controlled with drainage works, and that a cutoff was 
unnecessary. Modifications to the dam included a chimney 
drain, toe and blanket drains, and relief wells drilled into the 
artesian zone. The renovated dam was placed in service in 
1997 and has performed well. The renovated dam’s 
performance shows that predictions that the dam could be 
renovated without a cutoff were accurate. 
Fig. 9.  Renovated Dam Cross Section 
PROMINENT LESSONS 
This case and others from the literature show that a permeable 
dam foundation is rarely a benefit and is usually the opposite. 
Conclusions that a permeable foundation will help the dam by 
acting as a drain should always be subject to skepticism and a 
heavy burden of proof. 
Comparison to Other Dams 
The following sections describe nearby dams of similar size 
and soil conditions for comparison to the Lake Mailande Dam. 
Big Bay Lake Dam. Big Bay Lake Dam (see Fig. 10), near 
Purvis, Miss., was built in 1991. It experienced a sunny day 
failure unexpectedly in 2004. The dam is a 57 ft tall earth 
embankment; the impounded reservoir was about 1,100 ac 
(ASDSO, 2005). The dam was evidently built with a blanket 
drain, but without a foundation seepage cutoff. The failure 
mechanism is theorized to be piping through the foundation. 
Not enough information on the Big Bay Lake Dam has been 
published to allow comparison to Lake Mailande. 
Consequently, one cannot say whether foundation soils in this 
dam were more or less permeable than at Lake Mailande. 
Fig. 8.  Lake Mailande Dam at First Filling, 
Downstream Slope and Seepage Boil at Toe
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Fig. 10.  Big Bay Lake Dam Breach, Lamar County, 
Mississippi  
(Photos from National Weather Service, Jackson, Miss.) 
Bonita Lake Dam. Bonita Lake Dam (see Fig. 11) is within 4 
mi of Lake Mailande, with similar size of dam and reservoir. It 
was designed and built by NRCS for municipal water supply 
and flood control purposes. This dam is about 60 ft high and 
1,500 ft crest length, with 380,000 cu yd of embankment fill. 
Soil conditions here are similar to Lake Mailande, but there is 
less thickness of alluvial sand in the foundation. Artesian 
groundwater pressure was not encountered at Bonita Lake. 
Bonita Lake Dam was built with the elements that the BuRec 
design manual calls for—positive seepage cutoff and internal 
drain, although the drain here is a vertical chimney and not a 
horizontal blanket. The Bonita Lake Dam has performed 
without problems related to seepage. 
Other Dams in the Literature 
Table 1 summarizes many other case histories found in the 
literature of dams with permeable foundations. Table 1 is only 
a brief summary of a portion of the literature; it is not meant to 
be comprehensive. Examples of permeable foundation 
conditions that create problems are easily found, where 
examples of the opposite—permeable foundation soils 
providing benefit—are not. 
Fig. 11.  Bonita Lake Dam Photo and Cross Section 
Table 1.  Brief Summary of Case Histories 
Dam Description Reference 





117 ft tall, 1,860 ft long. 
Homogeneous dam on 
permeable foundation, relief 
wells installed in original 
construction. 2 yr after filling 
required toe drain system due 





49 ft tall, 61,200 ft long. 
Homogeneous dam on 
stratified foundation with 
permeable layers. Sand boils 
appeared near toe. Soil-
bentonite cutoff wall 







60 ft tall, 1,400 ft long. 
Homogeneous dam, 90 ft of 
soil in foundation, 60 ft of 
stratified glacial soils 
imparting uplift at toe. Small 
sand boils and excess head 
developed at toe, renovated 
with toe drain, stability berm, 
relief wells. 
ASCE, 1988 
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Dam Description Reference 
Sardis Dam, 
MS 
117 ft tall, 15,300 ft long. 
Foundation: thin layer of silt 
and clay overlying thick 
sand. Relief wells part of 
original construction, clogged 
after 36 yr of service, 
resulting in 3 to 7 ft excess 
head at toe. 






134 ft tall, 8 mi long. 
100 ft overburden soil in 
foundation including 
pervious soils. Cutoff wall 
built only in portion of dam 
near maximum section. 
Seepage and saturation, 
excess head developed at toe. 






30 ft tall, 18,000 ft long. 
Homogeneous embankment 
of sand on sand foundation. 
No foundation cutoff. Failed 
by breaching—suspected 






54 ft tall, 2,400 ft long. 
Upstream (u/s) seepage 
blanket and cutoff trench. 
Foundation of glacial soil 
with inter-bedded silt and 
sand layer—cutoff extended 
to the inter-bedded layer. 
Boils and excess head 
developed downstream (d/s), 





54 ft tall. 
Foundation soils: surface 
layer of clay underlain by 
pervious soil with artesian 
water pressure. Boils 
appeared d/s at first filling. 
Relief wells ineffective. 
Retrofit toe drain, later 







45 ft tall, 250 ft long. 
Foundation soils 50 ft thick 
with sand and gravel layers. 
Dam construction included 
u/s blanket, shallow trench 
cutoff and d/s horizontal 
blanket drain. Seepage boils 
developed at toe d/s of 
spillway;  relief wells 
installed to rehabilitate dam. 
Oskoorouchi, 
et al, 2000 





32 ft tall, 755 ft long. 
Homogeneous dam with 
shallow trench cutoff on 
permeable foundation 
(alluvial sand and gravel). 
Flood control dam failed 
when rapidly filled during 
Tropical Storm Nora, Sept, 
1997—internal erosion of 






62 ft tall, 1,250 ft long. 
Built in the 1930s, 
homogeneous dam on 
permeable foundation, 
shallow cutoff trench 5 ft 
depth. Seepage problems 
encountered in glacial soils 
requiring renovation work at 





78 ft tall, 1,980 ft long. 
Earth dam with chimney 
drain, cutoff trench excavated 
into weathered rock. Dike 
failed at first filling by piping 
through the foundation—
attributed to joints/fractures 
in the weathered rock that 






30 ft tall, 275 ft long. 
Earth dam on permeable, 
fractured rock foundation, 
steel core/cutoff wall through 
embankment and soil 
overburden to rock. Excess 
water pressure measured 16 






165 ft tall, zoned earth-fill on 
permeable sandstone 
foundation. Seepage 
problems required lowering 
reservoir to prevent failure. 
Foundation grout curtain 






338 ft tall, zoned 
embankment—earth-fill core 
and rock-fill shells. Seepage 
through foundation/core 
contact developed after 6 yr 
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Dam Description Reference 
Wolf Creek 
Dam, KY 
200 ft tall, combination earth-
fill + concrete dam on 
foundation of limestone with 
solution cavities. Seepage 
through foundation produced 
muddy flow and sinkholes 
d/s some 25 yr after first 







200 ft tall, 8,300 ft long. 
Earth-fill dam with 
permeable sand and broken 
rock, artesian water pressure 
in the foundation. Seeps on 
d/s slope required remedial 
drainage measures—rock 








25 ft tall, 4,500 ft long. 
Homogeneous earth-fill on 
permeable sand foundation. 
Extensive seepage d/s 
threatened failure by piping 
beneath principal spillway 








65 ft tall, 1,800 ft long. 
Earth-fill with blanket and 
toe drains on permeable sand 
foundation. Artesian head 
and sand boils developed d/s 
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